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Most economic developments are hard to predict. Considerable
uncertainty surrounds forecasts for output growth, inﬂation, and unem-
ployment a year from now, for instance. But demographic developments
are different in this respect. Although demographic surprises abound, the
major trends build slowly, and the broad contours of medium-term
outcomes become discernible well in advance. Given the decreases in
fertility rates and the increases in life expectancy that have already
occurred in most industrial countries, we can be pretty certain that the
population will age rapidly in coming decades. As one result, the ratio of
the population aged 65 and over to the population of working age will
likely rise sharply. Coincidentally, as child mortality in Third World
nations has declined, the ensuing baby booms have helped to drive a
predictable surge in emigration to the aging industrial countries. Since
child mortality rates in the Third World continue to fall, large-scale
migration will likely characterize the decades ahead. However, while we
can discern the general trajectory of demographic trends, the uncertainty
surrounding these projections is huge. Will world population growth
simply slow in coming decades, or will it actually turn negative?
Some consequences of future demographic trends, like the effect of
population aging on the ﬁnances of pay-as-you-go social insurance
systems, have been widely discussed. But much is still unknown about
how population shifts will affect the economy, particularly as some
forecasted demographic developments are entirely unprecedented.
Never before in human history have individual fertility choices led
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tively, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.national populations to shrink for extended periods, for instance. Accord-
ingly, demographers and economists have many issues to explore and a
growing body of work to synthesize.
With these goals in mind, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
brought together an international group of economists, demographers,
and other social and biological scientists to examine the topic “Seismic
Shifts: The Economic Impact of Demographic Change” at the Bank’s
forty-sixth economic conference. Early sessions covered lessons from
previous episodes of demographic shock, an assessment of ofﬁcial
demographic projections for the next half century, and the effect of
demographic change on U.S. labor markets. On the second day, partici-
pants explored the ﬁscal impact of U.S. demographic change, the effect of
demographic trends on global ﬂows of labor and capital, and the policy
implications of demographic projections. Still other presentations ad-
dressed the political dimensions of demographic change, and the roles of
immigration, assimilation, and acculturation in the new global era.
Several themes emerged at the conference. A number of speakers
pointed out that the current use of age 65 to deﬁne the start of old-age
dependency is arbitrary. As life expectancy has increased, the health of
the “young elderly” has also improved, and there is no inherent reason
why they should be dependent on younger generations to produce or
ﬁnance their subsistence. To the degree this is true, the “problem” of
increasing old-age dependency may not be much of a problem after all.
People are living longer and staying healthier to later ages, making it
possible for work to continue well into what used to be considered old
age.
Although conference participants tended to be optimistic regarding
the issue of old-age dependence, this attitude was tempered with concern
about the ﬁscal status of social insurance programs. Our notion of when
old age begins may have changed, but policymakers generally have made
only minor adjustments to the ages used to determine eligibility for social
insurance programs and to calculate beneﬁt amounts. Among conference
participants, the need to reform social insurance programs to prevent
future ﬁscal crises was surprisingly noncontroversial. Widely endorsed
policy recommendations included raising the ofﬁcial retirement age and
encouraging increased labor force participation by women and the young
elderly.
There was also a consensus that international migration will continue
to be an important phenomenon and that immigration can help to
attenuate problems associated with population aging in the industrial
countries. Most, but not all, participants thought that political factors
would likely prevent migration ﬂows from being large enough to have a
major impact on population aging, however.
Another theme to emerge from the conference was the importance of
education. Several participants noted that education has a signiﬁcant
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ipation and fertility in both the developed and the developing countries.
By inﬂuencing the pace of immigrants’ acculturation and the overall rate
of productivity growth, education also affects the ease with which
countries will adjust to the economic and political tensions engendered
by demographic change. A few participants expressed a related concern
that increases in income and education may be encouraging prolonged
population declines in some industrial countries. While all agreed that
small countries can thrive (witness Switzerland and Denmark), a few
noted that we do not know how ongoing population decline affects
economies.
Finally, although we know much about the massive demographic
shifts that will occur over the next few decades, conference participants
also emphasized how much we do not know. Areas of great uncertainty
include the size of future migrations, particularly from Africa to Europe;
the degree to which current low fertility rates in Japan and much of
Europe will rise toward replacement levels; the rate at which high fertility
rates in the developing world will fall toward replacement levels; the
extent to which life expectancy will increase over the next century; and
the pace at which medical costs will increase. Add to these questions the
possibility of massive environmental change or political upheaval, and
one comes away impressed with the wide range of possible scenarios for
the evolution of demographic change and its economic consequences.
THE POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE
Michael Teitelbaum adopts the conference title’s metaphor of “seis-
mic shifts” in his opening address. He notes that demographic trends can
be regarded as “human tectonics.” Like the movement of tectonic plates,
the demographic forces of decreased fertility rates, decreased mortality
rates, and increased migration from poor to rich countries work slowly
and steadily, building up enormous momentum. And in both geologic
and demographic tectonics, violent eruptions can occur if surface ten-
sions build up, rather than being gradually released.
Teitelbaum notes that the facts regarding these trends are not as
straightforward as some think. For example, while it has been widely
noted that fertility rates in much of the developed world have fallen well
below the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman, Teitelbaum
cautions that to some degree this development is a transitional phenom-
enon associated with the movement to childbearing at older ages, and
that eventual fertility rates for the current cohort of women of childbear-
ing age may be higher than the rates currently reported. It is clear that a
movement to lower fertility rates has occurred, but the long-run magni-
tude of the shift is not yet known.
Accompanying the decline in fertility rates is a decrease in mortality
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low fertility rates and increased life expectancy will result in an increase
in the old-age dependency ratio, now conventionally deﬁned as the
number of people aged 65 and over divided by the number of people of
working age. That this ratio will increase markedly in the near future
throughout the developed world is not controversial. However, Teitel-
baum notes that although age 65 might have been an appropriate
threshold for deﬁning old age when Social Security was ﬁrst established,
advances in health status and life expectancy since that time argue for
using a higher age threshold today.
In Teitelbaum’s view, the third demographic tectonic force, interna-
tional migration, cannot realistically be expected to occur in great enough
numbers to offset the aging of the native-born population. He cites a
recent UN report that concluded that the increase in immigration
required to hold constant the old-age dependency ratio in the industrial
countries would be so large as to be politically unacceptable. Teitelbaum
notes that although demographers and economists view immigrants as
factors of production, the general public sees immigrants as people with
particular (and different) cultural backgrounds. Even though one can
make an economic case for increased immigration when fertility is low,
the public is wary of immigration at such times because of the potential
effect on the receiving country’s culture.
Teitelbaum concludes that the best feasible solution is to adopt
multiple small-scale policies, gradually implemented. These measures
would include policies to encourage modest increases in fertility, immi-
gration, labor force participation, and the ofﬁcial retirement ages for
public pension programs, as well as modest constraints on public pension
beneﬁts and taxes.
DEMOGRAPHIC SHOCKS:T HE VIEW FROM HISTORY
Massimo Livi-Bacci’s paper examines demographic shocks from a
historical perspective. He begins by documenting the huge decline in
fertility that has occurred throughout the industrial world in the past half
century. Among the ten largest high-income countries, only the United
States has fertility close to the replacement level. Reviewing the history of
the Western world, Livi-Bacci concludes that not since the plague
epidemics of the late Middle Ages has there been a situation where
populations failed to reproduce themselves over a prolonged period.
Demographic shocks in the past were generally characterized by a
crisis that caused a sudden increase in mortality. According to Livi-Bacci,
the increase in deaths was usually accompanied by a temporary decrease
in fertility and births, postponement of marriages, and out-migration
from the area affected by the crisis. Following the end of the crisis, fertility
and marriage rates rebounded, and out-migrants often returned.
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shocks. The plague resulted in a century of depopulation in Europe
starting in 1348. The consequent shortage of labor resulted in higher real
wages; land previously cultivated was often turned into pasture; and
families and landholdings were restructured into larger units. The Irish
famine of the mid nineteenth century precipitated a large decline in the
population of Ireland. Demographic consequences included mass emi-
gration, an increase in age at marriage, and an increase in the proportion
of the adult population remaining single. Unlike the earlier episodes of
depopulation, which were caused by natural forces, the 1932-33 famine in
the Soviet Union was largely a result of a misguided policy of forced
collectivization. The ability of the population to cope with the crisis was
impeded by disruption of family and community networks because of
residential dislocation prior to the crisis, restrictions on movement out of
afﬂicted areas during the crisis, and the prohibition of private agricultural
production and trading.
The two world wars of the twentieth century resulted in large losses
of life, destruction of physical capital, and migration. France suffered the
highest rate of casualties during World War I and encouraged immigra-
tion after the war. Livi-Bacci also attributes the immigration to France,
Germany, and the Benelux countries during the post-World War II era in
part to the population losses during the war. The last episode reviewed
by Livi-Bacci is the ongoing period of political transition in the former
Soviet Union, which has been accompanied by increased mortality and
reduced fertility. Underlying reasons for the demographic shifts include
increased poverty, a deterioration of the health care system, increased
lawlessness, and increased psychosocial stress.
Livi-Bacci draws several conclusions from his review of past demo-
graphic shocks. He notes that population rebounds tend to occur after
periods of loss, but that the structural demographic and economic
changes caused by shocks have long-run consequences. He concludes
that the adaptive responses a society makes to crises depend very much
on the characteristics of that society, on its ﬂexibility and its ability to
adjust at both the societal and the individual levels. Where traditional
mechanisms of solidarity, coping strategies, and economic buffers are
destroyed, crises and their consequences are more severe. The future will
depend on our ability to correct negative trends and increase social
ﬂexibility through a reconsideration of age and gender patterns of social
activity and functions.
Joel Mokyr interprets Livi-Bacci’s analysis of the consequences of
demographic shocks such as the plague or Irish famine in terms of a
simple Malthusian model. A key assumption of this model is that the
birth rate increases and the death rate decreases as the real wage and
incomes increase. A shock such as a plague or famine, which reduces the
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and an eventual return to the initial population and wage levels.
However, Mokyr argues that the variant of the model that best
approximates the current situation in industrial countries is one where, as
income increases beyond some threshold, the birth rate starts to fall
instead of continuing to rise. Mokyr’s reasoning is that raising children
and consuming goods and services both take time. As income goes up,
and people can afford to increase their consumption, they choose to
spend less of their time on children and the birth rate decreases. If the
birth rate falls below that needed for population replacement, eventually
real wages and incomes will rise as a result of the declining population,
reinforcing the process. The result would be a continuously declining
population. In other words, the demographic rebound that followed
historical episodes of population decline would not occur.
Mokyr also describes the factors underlying the decline in infectious
disease in the industrial nations starting in the late nineteenth century.
According to Mokyr, life expectancy depends on income, relative prices,
and knowledge. Income growth allows people to consume more of all
goods and services, including those that enhance health. Changes in
relative prices, often resulting from public health measures or technolog-
ical advances, determine the affordability of health-enhancing goods and
services. Knowledge of what is good, or bad, for one’s health allows
individuals to adjust their behavior to protect their health.
David Weil divides his discussion of Livi-Bacci’s paper into three
sections: economic lessons, demographic lessons, and cultural/political
lessons. Although Weil thinks that slow or negative population growth
by itself is not a major problem, and that the economic consequences of
increased old-age dependency are manageable, he believes the use of
public pension programs to support the elderly will create major prob-
lems as population aging occurs. Public pension programs reduce the
labor supply of the elderly and produce additional distortions through
the imposition of taxes to fund the programs.
Turning to the demographic lessons, Weil interprets the historical
shocks reviewed by Livi-Bacci in the context of a Malthusian model
similar to that presented by Joel Mokyr. Like Mokyr, Weil is skeptical of
whether the traditional Malthusian mechanism is currently operative. He
notes that there now appears to be little relationship between income per
capita and the birth rate in industrial countries, and in developing
countries higher per capita incomes are associated with reduced fertility.
Weil believes that the current demographic shock is the result of a shift in
preferences toward wanting fewer children.
Weil’s discussion of cultural and political lessons focuses on the role
of immigration, which he believes is the only feasible solution to
problems induced by population aging in Western Europe. Weil believes
the impediments to immigration are cultural and political, rather than
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Western Europe that is needed to make its demographic situation
manageable is only about one-half the rate into the United States during
its period of heavy immigration in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. This calculation leads Weil to conclude that immigration may
be a feasible solution to Europe’s demographic problems.
WORLD POPULATION IN 2050: ASSESSING THE
PROJECTIONS
Joel Cohen reviewed the major population projections from the UN
Population Division (UNPD) and the U.S. Census Bureau for the world,
the United States, and other areas through 2050. He began by underscor-
ing the uncertainty surrounding these projections. Even in the rich United
States, with its good statistical systems, mistakes regarding the existing
population base have often been the largest source of error in short-term
projections. Moreover, Cohen warned, neither apparent precision nor
consensus should encourage conﬁdence since demographers use the
same tools and confer.
Cohen sees four major demographic trends. 1) The world population
will be bigger by 2 to 4 billion people by 2050, with all of the gain
occurring in the poor countries. 2) Population growth will slow; whether
it slows to a halt depends on choices made now about investments in
women’s education and reproductive health. 3) Almost all of the popu-
lation growth will occur in cities in poor countries—an outcome that will
give rise to unprecedented epidemiological challenges. 4) Populations
will age.
Cohen stressed that the ofﬁcial projections are no-surprise, business-
as-usual projections even though surprises are part of the human
condition. He listed a few possible shocks, like a major polar ice melt that
could raise the mean sea level by 55 to 70 meters, with major effects on
coastal cities. He noted the appearance of drug-resistant malaria and TB
and pointed out that no one was expecting AIDS, Y2K or information
viruses, the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, or the collapse
of the Soviet Union. Of course, people have already survived many
surprises, so everything may turn out ﬁne. But we have to expect
surprises.
Exploring the major trends in detail, Cohen reports that the UN98
“medium” projection anticipates that world population will grow from
6.1 billion in 2000 to 8.9 billion in 2050. But this projection assumes a fall
in fertility that many ﬁnd optimistic. In the UN’s medium scenario, the
population of the developed countries will fall by 3 percent by 2050 while
the population of the less developed countries will rise by almost 60
percent. As a result, the rich countries will hold a small and diminishing
share of the world population, regardless of fertility assumptions. With
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oped countries in the UN projection, up from 59 today, Cohen suggests
that an acceptable quality of life may be hard to achieve.
Turning to global aging, Cohen points out that the median age of the
world’s population rose 3 years to 26.6 between 1900 and 2000. In the
UN98 medium projection, that median age will rise by over 11 years to
37.8 in the half century to 2050. This rapid aging reﬂects reduced fertility
and longer life expectancy at birth, which has increased from about 30
years in 1900 to more than 66 years in 2000. As a result, the ratio of old
(65 plus) to young (0 to 4) will likely rise from 1:1 now to 3.3:1 in 2050.
Reﬂecting these trends, the world dependency ratio—the ratio of the
number of people age 14 and younger plus those ages 65 and over to the
number ages 15 to 64—peaked in 1965 to 1970 and has been falling since.
In the UN98 medium projection, this ratio will reach a minimum near
2015 and then slowly climb as the elderly population rises faster than the
young population declines. This roller-coaster pattern, as Cohen de-
scribes it, will appear everywhere—ﬁrst in the more, later in the less
developed countries. The low point in this ratio represents a peak in the
number of (potential) workers per dependent, a period known as “the
demographic bonus.” The industrial countries are now passing through
this peak and will soon be rolling rapidly away from it. For the United
States, both the UN and the Census Bureau project that the dependency
ratio will rise sharply between 2010 and 2035, more gradually thereafter.
While some demographers and economists like the dependency ratio
as a summary measure of a country’s age structure, Cohen emphasizes
that interest in the measure rests on the questionable assumption that
individuals ages 15 to 64 are “workers” while others are “dependents.”
But in developing countries youngsters often work while in the industrial
countries, young adults are often in school. At the other end of the age
spectrum, the economic “burden” imposed by population aging will
largely depend on the health of the elderly. National longitudinal surveys
indicate that chronic disability among the elderly could be declining as
fast as 1.5 percent a year. Such a rate of decline would likely keep the ratio
of the economically active aged 20 to 64 to the chronically disabled aged
65 and older from falling below recent levels. This trend shows the
danger of extrapolating directly from the dependency ratio to “burden,”
Cohen notes.
Cohen reviews the (similar) assumptions underlying the UNPD and
U.S. Census Bureau projections. For fertility, the UN assumes that where
the actual fertility rate was above 2.1 children per woman (the replace-
ment rate) in 1990 to 1995, fertility will decline smoothly until it hits 2.1,
where it will stay. For countries with recent fertility rates below replace-
ment, fertility is assumed to rise to a level just under replacement—
permanently. But Cohen knows of no case where fertility has actually
declined to replacement level and stayed there, or where below-replace-
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Cohen notes that, unlike the UN, Census considers trends in contracep-
tion and women’s educational attainment in projecting fertility rates. He
applauds the use of such data but notes that Census does not make the
links between these non-demographic factors and the demographic
targets explicit.
As for mortality, the UN assumes that life expectancy will increase—
except in countries with widespread HIV, those embroiled in strife, and
formerly Communist countries where mortality rates have already stag-
nated or risen for years. Demographers once thought that mortality
would only improve, but recent surprises have shown otherwise.
Admitting that international migration is hard to project reliably, the
UNPD simply sorts countries into groups for which net migration is
nonzero for given periods. The United States is in the set of countries with
positive immigration for the whole projection period. Europe is not
included in that group, even though, as Cohen points out, Africa will
have a (mostly young) population three times as large as Europe’s
(mostly old) population in 50 years, with only the Mediterranean between
them.
Finally, Cohen notes that demographers are developing projection
techniques, including new methods of assessing uncertainty, which the
ofﬁcial agencies have yet to embrace. While the ofﬁcial agencies have
adopted a few of the new tools, their basic approach differs little from that
used in 1895. Cohen hopes that the most recent demographic innovations
will be widely adopted well before the end of this century.
In commenting on Cohen’s paper, Cynthia Lloyd notes that high-
lights from the UNPD 2000 revisions to the 1998 projections are now
available. These revisions suggest that the world population in 2050 will
be larger by 413 million than previously thought—mostly because
fertility has remained unexpectedly high in Bangladesh, India, Nigeria,
and other developing countries. Indeed, the UNPD no longer assumes
that fertility in the high-fertility countries will fall to replacement level by
2050. Lloyd also argues that the process of urbanization is more complex
than Cohen suggests, because most recent migrants to urban centers
come from other cities and towns, not rural areas. Since residents of small
cities and towns fare worse in terms of health status than residents of
large cities, focusing concern on the mega-cities may be misguided.
Lloyd devotes the rest of her comment to the possibly “seismic”
issues linked to the youth bulge in many poor countries. She reminds us
that when the ratio of youth to the adult cohort rises as child mortality
starts to fall, the transition from large families to smaller, “better-quality”
families usually follows with a lag. But the ratio of young adults (15 to 24)
to prime age adults is far higher in many developing countries now than
it was during the demographic transition in the West. Never more than 26
percent of the population in the developed countries, the young are
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countries in 2005. Educating this unusually large cohort represents a
major challenge. Moreover, the cohort is so big that continued population
growth in these countries is assured even if the generation’s fertility falls
to replacement level. The only way to slow this momentum is to increase
age at ﬁrst birth. Since educational attainment is linked to greater age at
ﬁrst birth, investment in education becomes a tool of population policy.
Some Asian economies invested heavily in education and reaped a
demographic bonus as youth dependency fell. But Lloyd and her
coauthors ﬁnd that many sub-Saharan African countries have recently
experienced actual declines in school enrollment and educational attain-
ment (Lloyd, Kaufman, and Hewett 2000). Even where enrollment rates
are high, primary school completion rates vary because children enter
school late and attend only sporadically.
Lloyd concludes that the accuracy of population projections depends
importantly on today’s investments in young people. Assumptions about
improved mortality, declining fertility, and modest immigration are tied
to unstated assumptions about steady increases in educational attainment
and economic growth. If these assumptions are not met, the world could
face some unpleasant demographic surprises.
Taking up where Cohen left off, Wolfgang Lutz was conﬁdent that
the use of innovative methods of population projection was accelerating.
Indeed, he was 90 percent certain that institutional projection procedures
would include probabilistic elements by the end of this century. As
evidence he noted that he and his colleagues were about to publish an
article in Nature that used a synthesis of competing approaches to deal
with uncertainty in future population trends (Lutz, Sanderson, and
Scherbov 2001).
These new methods require two decisions about future demographic
trends: The ﬁrst concerns the process used to generate the time series for
vital rates while the second concerns assumptions about the future range
of uncertainty. To specify the time series, demographers can use piece-
wise linear regressions, as the major statistical ofﬁces do now, or they can
use a procedure with annual ﬂuctuations, which tends to provide more
realistic outcomes. Lutz and his colleagues opted for a moving-average
model with ﬂuctuations. Assumptions about the future range of uncer-
tainty can be based on ex post analysis of past projections, time series
models, or judgment reﬂecting explicit argument. In Nature, they describe
their use of a synthesis of all three approaches, which produced a broader
range of uncertainty than does the ex post error method alone. Using this
synthetic approach to calculate the chance that population growth will
end in this century, Lutz and his colleagues estimated an 85-percent
probability that world population will peak and start to fall before 2100.
They see a a 15-percent probability that the world population will be
smaller in 2100 than it is today.
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“business-as-usual” numbers, Lutz notes that demographers face a
dilemma in dealing with the possibility of extreme events, like a major
meteor strike, since they usually have no theoretical basis for making
assumptions about the probability of such events. But one approach is to
deﬁne the uncertainty distributions for future vital rates to include some
high-impact, low-probability events at the tails. Adopting this long-tails
approach in their Nature article produced one catastrophic increase in
mortality in 2,000 simulations.
Lutz suggests that conventional population projections could be
improved by incorporating major covariables beyond age and sex. Level
of education and urban/rural residence are key candidates, since they
have a big impact on population dynamics. Lutz also argues that the
relative weight of various regions in the world economy will likely reﬂect
the absolute number of working-age people with secondary and tertiary
education within their borders, as well as the population share of this
educated group. According to Lutz and his coauthors, China’s educated
working-age population is likely to grow to 750 million in 2050 while in
Europe and North America together, the size of the educated working-
age population will only reach 510 million.
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND U.S. LABOR MARKETS
Jane Little and Robert Triest examine the probable impact of
demographic change on U.S. labor markets. They start by reviewing the
three major demographic trends affecting the United States: slow popu-
lation growth, population aging, and increased immigration. Although
the 2000 Census revealed that the U.S. population grew more during the
1990s than previously estimated, the Census Bureau is projecting that the
decline and stabilization of fertility rates that began in the mid 1960s will
result in fairly steady declines in the population growth rate over the next
ﬁfty years. Combined with a trend of increasing life expectancy, this
decline implies that an increasing share of the population will be of
traditional retirement age. Although the growth of the native-born
working-age population has already slowed, immigration has increased,
and legal immigrants appear to have supplied roughly 40 percent of the
growth of the U.S. labor force in the mid 1990s. The Census Bureau
projects that new (post-2000) immigrants and their descendants will
account for nearly two-thirds of population growth in the United States
in the twenty-ﬁrst century.
As a consequence of the aging of the population, the ratio of the
population age 65 and over to the working-age population is projected to
double over the course of this century. The total dependency ratio, which
counts children under age 15 and adults age 65 and over as dependents,
will increase by a smaller proportion. The projected increase in depen-
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which living standards can advance at the same time that the share of the
population of traditional working age is shrinking.
The seriousness of the problem depends on how the economy
responds to the changing demographic conditions. One possible response
is an increase in labor productivity that would help to alleviate the effect
of increased economic dependency on living standards. As noted by
previous researchers, slower growth in labor supply will tend to push up
wages, providing an incentive for investment in productivity-increasing
technology. Several studies have provided empirical evidence consistent
with this hypothesis. Little and Triest present results from regressions
showing the existence of a negative relationship between U.S. productiv-
ity growth and the growth rate of the working-age population. Although
the authors stress that, at best, the regressions are capturing a reduced-
form relationship, the results give some grounds for hoping that the very
low rates of labor force growth that the United States will experience
early in this century will be accompanied by relatively high rates of
productivity growth.
An important factor in the determination of labor productivity that is
not controlled for in the regressions is the educational attainment of the
labor force. Future trends in educational attainment are difﬁcult to
predict, in part because of the increased importance of immigration.
Although a higher percentage of foreign-born U.S. residents have earned
graduate degrees than have U.S.-born residents, immigrants are also
much more likely not to have completed high school. Underlying this
pattern are large differences in the educational attainment of immigrants
by country of origin. Over two-thirds of Mexican immigrants ages 25 to
64 have not completed high school, compared to about one-third of
immigrants from other Western Hemisphere countries and less than
one-sixth of native-born Americans and immigrants from outside the
Western Hemisphere. Although there is a pronounced trend toward
higher educational attainment among recent cohorts of Mexican immi-
grants, a large gap with the educational attainment of native-born
Americans will likely continue well into the future.
Little and Triest also present data showing that the educational
attainment of U.S.-born Hispanics and blacks continues to be signiﬁcantly
lower than that of non-Hispanic whites, on average. Overall, the data
suggest the possibility of stagnating aggregate levels of educational
attainment in the future.
Increased consumption of imported goods and immigration are
alternative means of tapping foreign labor supplies for the production of
domestically consumed goods and services. The authors point out,
however, that despite some similarities, increased trade and immigration
are not economically equivalent. Because immigrants consume goods and
services in this country, immigration raises labor demand by a greater
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more productive in the United States than in their country of origin, and
they can produce non-tradable goods for consumption in the United
States only if they migrate here. Indeed, immigrants play a dispropor-
tionate role in supplying services, like home health care, that loom
relatively large in the consumption patterns of the elderly.
Little and Triest also touch on how demographic shifts will affect the
wage structure and the NAIRU. They argue that the shrinking supply of
younger workers relative to older workers is likely to decrease the wage
premium attached to labor market experience, and that the interaction of
increased demand for highly educated workers and relatively stagnant
supply may increase the economic return to education. The aging of the
labor force can also be expected to reduce unemployment rates (and the
NAIRU), although much of that effect may already have occurred.
Policy implications drawn by Little and Triest include the need for
addressing the educational needs of Hispanic youth and the need for
reform of social insurance programs, for instance, by extending the age
for retirement with full Social Security beneﬁts as longevity increases.
They identify efforts to reduce residential isolation and increased federal
funding for communities affected by immigration as possible means of
promoting Hispanic educational attainment.
Axel Boersch-Supan comments on Little and Triest’s paper from a
European perspective. He points out that the process of population aging
has progressed further in much of Europe than it has in the United States;
the recent European experience can serve as a preview of what is to come
in the United States. Germany and Italy, for example, now have roughly
the population age distribution that the United States will have in 2025.
Boersch-Supan emphasizes that the increase in the dependency ratio
induced by population aging severely strains pay-as-you-go social insur-
ance systems, and that Germany, Italy, and the United States need to give
high priority to social security reform.
Boersch-Supan’s analysis of the effect of population aging on pro-
ductivity growth differs from that of Little and Triest. His analysis of
age-speciﬁc productivity levels suggests that productivity is reduced by
aging of the labor force. However, this effect is small relative to the loss
in production that results from the shrinking share of the population that
is working. An increase in the quantity of capital per worker may
potentially boost productivity, but Boersch-Supan believes this invest-
ment is unlikely to occur unless social security programs are reformed.
Because consumption patterns differ over age groups, aging of the
population can be expected to produce shifts in the pattern of labor
demand across sectors. According to Boersch-Supan’s calculations, about
one-ﬁfth of the German workforce will need to shift sectors in response to
demographic change. He thinks that this transfer will be more difﬁcult to
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inﬂexibility of European labor markets.
In his discussion, James Smith disagrees with elements of Little and
Triest’s analysis of how the labor market will adjust to demographic
shifts. He is skeptical about whether the empirical relationship between
the growth of the working-age population and labor productivity esti-
mated by Little and Triest should be interpreted as causal. Smith points
out that movements in population growth rates are forecastable, and so
changes in investment behavior in response to changes in the growth rate
of the working-age population should precede the actual occurrence of
the demographic changes. Smith believes that the coincidence of the
productivity-depressing oil shocks with the rapid growth of the working-
age population in the 1970s, and the coincidence of the computer
technology-induced productivity growth boom with the slow growth of
the working-age population in the 1990s, may be responsible for the
relationship estimated by Little and Triest.
Smith also takes issue with Little and Triest’s analysis of the impact
of immigration on educational attainment and productivity growth. He
makes the theoretical point that immigration of workers who are less
educated than native-born workers would be expected to increase the
productivity of native-born workers. However, Smith questions whether
there is, in fact, a gap between the education levels of immigrants and the
native-born. In a recent study coauthored with Guillermina Jasso and
Mark Rosenzweig, Smith found that legal, permanent immigrants have
higher education and skill levels than do native-born workers. Smith also
believes that Little and Triest present an unduly pessimistic view of the
degree of progress over generations in the educational attainment of the
descendants of Latino immigrants. He believes that assembling the data
in a manner that avoids confusing age and generation effects leads one to
ﬁnd a greater rate of progress in educational attainment.
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND THE CULTURAL IMPACT OF
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE
In his address on immigration and acculturation, Marcelo Sua ´rez-
Orozco began by asking, “Is what is going on in East Los Angeles today
the same as what happened on New York’s Lower East Side 100 years
ago?” While similarities exist, Sua ´rez-Orozco argued that it is premature
to conclude that the Mexicans are the Irish of the new millennium and
will follow the same trajectory, since half of the Mexicans living in East
Los Angeles arrived just 10 years ago. Moreover, new information,
communication, and transportation technologies have changed the na-
ture of both the immigration process and the destination. That is, they
have changed migrants’ ability to maintain ties with their homelands and
turned the United States into a thoroughly multicultural society.
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child population and one in ﬁve children living in immigrant homes, how
well these youngsters adapt is critically important for this country’s
future. Right now, the outcome is extraordinarily bimodal. Immigrants
are overrepresented at Harvard and among Nobel Laureates, but they are
also overrepresented among school dropouts and prison inmates.
Our ideas about assimilation are being bypassed, Sua ´rez-Orozco
suggests, by the new transnational strategies that immigrants employ.
Symptomatic of these efforts to maintain ties to two countries, remittances
now total more than $100 billion a year and for many countries are the
largest component of the capital inﬂows they receive. Increasingly,
moreover, source countries are developing dual-nationality arrange-
ments that allow immigrants to participate in the domestic politics of
their country of birth. The last Dominican election was fought and won in
New York, not Santo Domingo, he noted.
In the receiving nations, by contrast, the newest wave of immigration
is rekindling the same concerns voiced 100 years ago. While the second
law of immigration is “Immigrants, we love them,” the ﬁrst law expresses
eternal doubts about the cultural impact of large-scale inﬂows. But,
Sua ´rez-Orozco argues, these concerns reﬂect a misunderstanding of the
nature of culture. He suggests dividing culture into two parts—mental
and expressive—with mental culture referring to the skills and behaviors
required to make a living, and expressive culture referring to values,
world outlooks, and patterns of interpersonal relations.
Ideas about the skills needed to function in today’s global economies
have everywhere converged. These requirements include cognitive and
symbolic reasoning, good work habits, communication and interpersonal
skills, and, increasingly, an ability to work in other cultures. Immigrants
know that their children must acquire these abilities. Indeed, immigration
represents a chance to offer their children access to these skills.
In sharp contrast, he ﬁnds immigrant parents to be ambivalent about
their children’s exposure to the expressive elements of U.S. culture, which
they perceive to have an anti-education, anti-authority streak that glori-
ﬁes violence and precocious sexual behavior. This exposure is particu-
larly problematic for children from Latin America, who are more likely to
attend hyper-segregated schools than any other youngsters in the coun-
try. For them, mainstream U.S. culture is something they watch on
television.
Although today’s immigrants are highly diverse, they share common
values centered on family, hard work, and optimism. The largest number
of visas by far is granted for family reuniﬁcation. Still, the fundamental
motivation for immigration remains the hope of ﬁnding a better life, a
better job. And immigrants see hard work as essential to the project.
Sua ´rez-Orozco suggests that these attitudes strengthen the cultural stock
of the nation.
SEISMIC SHIFTS: AN OVERVIEW 15Of course, immigration changes the dominant culture as well as the
immigrants themselves. We speak, eat, and dance differently in the
United States today than we did 30 years ago because of recent,
large-scale immigration. Immigration changes everyone, but rather than
advocating that immigrant children abandon all elements of their culture
as they assimilate, a more promising path, Sua ´rez-Orozco believes, is to
nurture hybrid identities and trans-cultural competencies. In this global
era, the tenets of unidirectional assimilation are clearly no longer rele-
vant. Today the beneﬁts to being able to operate across cultures are
obvious, and immigrant children have advantages in this regard. Their
abilities are assets to be celebrated and cultivated.
THE FISCAL IMPACT OF U.S. DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE
Ronald Lee and Ryan Edwards examine the ﬁscal impact of demo-
graphic change in the United States. Their paper starts with a critical
review of demographic assumptions and projections made by the Social
Security Administration. They contrast the ofﬁcial projections with sto-
chastic forecasts developed by Lee and coauthors in previous research.
The stochastic forecasting approach has the advantage of explicitly
modeling the uncertainty embedded in the forecasts and providing a
probability distribution over the range of possible outcomes.
Lee and Edwards then present a model of how population aging
resulting from reduced fertility affects public decisions regarding spend-
ing on age-targeted programs. In their model, demographic shifts alter
the trade-offs between different policy options. Beneﬁts targeted to the
old are much more costly than those targeted at the young, and
population aging increases the cost of age-related programs by increasing
the proportion of the population eligible for beneﬁts targeted to the old.
The proportion of aggregate income that must be devoted to the
programs increases as a result of the shift in the age distribution.
Policymakers can be expected to respond to the increased “price” of
providing beneﬁts to the aged by reducing the level of beneﬁts per
recipient (although total expenditures on the aged may still increase
because of the increased number of beneﬁciaries). Lee and Edwards cite
the increase in the normal retirement age for the U.S. Social Security
system as an example of this phenomenon.
Lee and Edwards calculate how the trade-off between after-tax
income and provision of age-targeted beneﬁts will change during the
twenty-ﬁrst century separately for the U.S. federal government and for
state and local governments. Although there is little change in the
trade-off for state and local governments, the relative cost of age-targeted
programs for the federal government increases sharply as the baby boom
generation starts retiring early in the century. Lee and Edwards project
that the relative cost of federal age-targeted programs will continue to
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when the baby boom generation has passed but population aging
continues as a result of improved life expectancy.
Lee and Edwards present projections of government expenditures
and revenues at the federal and the combined state and local levels for the
twenty-ﬁrst century. Although their model of the trade-off between
after-tax income and age-related government expenditures suggests that
population aging may reduce the generosity of age-targeted programs,
they assume that government beneﬁt programs remain largely un-
changed, in order to provide a clear baseline for understanding how
population aging will affect the ﬁscal balance. If government revenues
were to grow at the rate of productivity growth, which is roughly what
would be expected if tax laws were left unchanged, the ratio of public
debt to GDP would reach untenable levels by the end of the century. Lee
and Edwards avoid that problem by assuming instead that the Social
Security payroll tax is adjusted in such a way that the Social Security trust
fund never falls below the cost of the following year’s beneﬁt payments,
and that other federal taxes are adjusted so that the ratio of public debt to
GDP does not exceed 0.8.
Although Lee and Edwards forecast little change in state and local
government expenditures as a share of GDP, under their assumptions
federal expenditures will grow from 16 percent of GDP to close to 40
percent of GDP by 2100. The bulk of this growth is the result of projected
increases in spending on programs for the elderly. Lee and Edwards
project that only about one-eighth of the increased government spending
on the elderly will be in Social Security retirement payments, with most
of the rest accounted for by added spending on health programs.
However, they caution that their assumptions may lead to understate-
ment of Social Security’s share of the spending increase.
Lee and Edwards examine two possible means of attenuating the
projected ﬁscal consequences of demographic change: increased fertility
and increased immigration. Both would reduce the growth in the fraction
of the population receiving beneﬁts targeted to the elderly, and both are
estimated to have a positive ﬁscal impact. However, Lee and Edwards
caution that increased fertility may be associated with negative environ-
mental externalities and that the aggregate ﬁscal impact of increased
immigration is likely to be modest.
Paul Atkinson draws on recent work at the OECD on the ﬁscal
implications of aging populations in his discussion of the paper by Lee
and Edwards. Projections made by the OECD study are similar in many
respects to those of Lee and Edwards, but the OECD study projects
signiﬁcantly less growth in spending on health programs. Atkinson
points to two differences in assumptions that may be affecting the health
program expenditure projections. Lee and Edwards assume greater
increases in life expectancy than does the OECD. They also assume that
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labor productivity over the entire forecast period, which Atkinson
suggests may be too pessimistic. Despite these caveats regarding the
quantitative estimates, Atkinson agrees with Lee and Edwards’s conclu-
sion that increased spending on health programs will be the largest
contributor to ﬁscal problems in the United States.
Atkinson’s summary of the OECD report shows that the United
States is expected to face a less severe old-age dependency problem than
most of the other OECD countries. The OECD study expects the U.S.
fertility rate to be somewhat higher than those of the other member
countries over the next half century, and it also expects the United States
to experience above-average levels of immigration. As a result, the
old-age dependency ratio will rise less in the United States than in almost
all of the other OECD countries.
The OECD has projected the increase in age-related spending in its
member countries for the ﬁrst half of the twenty-ﬁrst century, assuming
that policies remain unchanged except for reforms that have already been
legislated. The United States is expected to experience lower than average
growth in spending on publicly funded pensions, but a greater than
average increase in spending on health programs for the aged. Atkinson
cautions that the difﬁcult policy decisions needed regarding social
security and medical care programs only become more difﬁcult as they
are delayed. He stresses the need for creating conditions that encourage
private saving for retirement.
In his discussion of Lee and Edwards’s paper, Eugene Steuerle
points out that population aging reﬂects both reduced fertility and longer
life expectancy. Lower fertility results in an increase in the fraction of the
population who are in the last portion of their lives and may be
economically dependent. Increased life expectancy means that individu-
als have more years to live, generally in better health at every age. Greater
longevity creates ﬁscal problems for social insurance programs that have
ﬁxed ages of eligibility, but it need not signify that an increased fraction
of the population is dependent.
Steuerle notes that people are spending an increasing fraction of their
lives receiving retirement beneﬁts, as life expectancy increases but typical
retirement ages remain unchanged. This results in idle human capital and
lost economic output. He believes that labor demand developments may
result in increased labor force participation by older individuals, espe-
cially if policy changes remove impediments to their work effort. If such
an increase in labor supply does not occur, the United States will
experience a prolonged period of declining adult employment rates, the
macroeconomic consequences of which Steuerle believes deserve further
attention.
Steuerle points out that it is not solely population aging that drives
our increased spending on age-related programs. Much of the increased
18 Jane Sneddon Little and Robert K. Triestspending on health care programs for the aged is caused by an increase
in the relative price of medical care services, which have not experienced
the below-average price increases of almost all other growth sectors of the
economy. Steuerle urges careful attention to these costs, and to the macro
and micro impacts associated with the scheduled increase in the share of
human capital that will be wasted if we permit a continuing decline in the
adult labor force participation rate.
DEMOGRAPHIC SHOCKS AND GLOBAL FACTOR FLOWS
Jeffrey Williamson’s paper deals with the links between demo-
graphic shocks, mass migrations, and international capital ﬂows. To
matter, he points out, a shock must be big and must change the
composition of the population. Wiping out a disease that kills randomly
will inﬂuence the size but not the structure of a population, but a medical
advance that lengthens life will increase the share of the population that
is elderly. A big baby boom also has a long-term effect on a population’s
age structure. In the OECD, the postwar baby boom is the best known
example. But the sharp decline in child mortality in the Third World in
the past ﬁfty years has created a far bigger demographic shock.
This shock reﬂects the shift from the high fertility and mortality rates
of the pre-industrial era to the low fertility and mortality of the post-
industrial era. Because parents’ expectations concerning their children’s
survival adjust with a lag, a decline in child mortality results in a youth
glut that moves slowly through the population as the transition cohort
ages. This shift can take decades to complete.
Williamson’s paper examines how such shocks affect global factor
ﬂows—starting with labor. Since young adults have most to gain/least to
lose by moving, migrants disproportionately self-select from this age
group. When a large cohort enters the labor market, the glut of young
adults reduces wages and encourages emigration if the glut is in a
sending region. As a result, mass migrations from nations in the middle
of their demographic transition tend to ﬂood advanced nations that have
already ﬁnished theirs, unless the ﬂow is impeded by immigration policy.
If so, illegal immigration ensues.
Turning to capital, Williamson reminds us that capital inﬂows reﬂect
a gap between domestic savings and investment, both of which are
affected by demography. On the savings side, he cites the admittedly
controversial Coale-Hoover (1958) dependency burden hypothesis,
which suggests that rapid population growth in a demographic transition
ﬁrst raises the child-dependency burden and boosts consumption at the
expense of savings. Then, as the youth glut matures, accumulating
savings contribute to an economic “miracle.” Later, as the large cohort
ages and the elderly-dependency burden rises, savings dwindle and the
miracle ends.
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tious since most economists agree that the need to equip and house a
baby-boom cohort raises the demand for investment as the cohort enters
the workforce. While investment demand and domestic savings tend to
rise and fall together in the transition, any gap between the two triggers
world capital ﬂows and sets their direction. Studying Asia from 1950 to
1992, Higgins and Williamson ﬁnd that investment demand exceeds
domestic savings early in the transition, while later the savings supply
outruns the demand for investment. Thus, nations making the demo-
graphic transition import capital for many years, then enter an era of
ﬁnancial independence as the transition cohort reaches age 40 and
investment demand falls faster than savings.
Williamson suggests that his demographic arguments explain large-
scale international factor ﬂows in the mass migrations from Europe
before 1914, contemporary emigration from Africa, pre-1914 capital ﬂows
from Europe, and East Asian capital ﬂows from 1950 to 1992. Indeed,
although other developments were also important, he ﬁnds that over half
of Europe’s emigration before World War I was driven by the rise in the
share of young adults in the sending regions, as the local labor glut cut
real incomes.
The same forces that drove European emigration before 1914 are
even more powerful in Africa today, Williamson suggests. For example,
European-African wage gaps are double those for the New World and
low-income Europe in the 1800s. To date, restrictions on immigration to
Europe have helped stem the migrant tide, but Williamson argues that
larger ﬂows can be expected. With the young adult share of the African
population expected to rise by several percentage points by 2025,
Williamson anticipates that African emigration could reach the same pace
as European emigration in the 1870s.
Williamson next notes that international capital ﬂows in the late
1800s were larger than ever before or since. Britain was the era’s
preeminent capital exporter, with one-third of its wealth invested over-
seas in 1913. As an early example of Lucas’s Paradox, two-thirds of this
capital went to the rich New World with one-tenth of the world’s
population, while only one-fourth went to Asia and Africa with almost
two-thirds of the world’s people. Observers usually argue that labor and
capital both sought natural resources. Alternatively, Williamson points to
the gap between youth dependency ratios in the Old and New Worlds.
Rapid population growth in the New World led to strong investment
demand, while its high youth dependency rate discouraged domestic
savings. Given Europe’s relatively low youth dependency ratio and high
savings rate at the time, Williamson believes that the dependency-burden
model may explain two-thirds of British net foreign investment before
1914.
In his ﬁnal example, Williamson argues that East Asia’s demographic
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capital exporter. East Asian savings rates soared from an average 14
percent in the late 1950s to 35 percent in the early 1990s, while investment
as a share of GDP rose almost (but not quite) as much. As the current
account balance swung from deﬁcit to surplus, East Asia went from
heavy dependence on foreign capital to ﬁnancial independence. The shift
was highly correlated with the decline in East Asia’s youth dependency
burden, which peaked in the 1960s at levels far above the highs seen in
the advanced nations during their transitions.
Williamson ends by pointing out that the world’s two halves are in
different demographic stages. The elderly OECD should want to invest its
capital surplus in a Third World now burdened by a capital deﬁcit, while
the young Third World will want to send its labor surplus to OECD
countries struggling with labor scarcity. Will policymakers allow this
intergenerational transfer to occur? Williamson wondered.
While Gary Burtless found Williamson’s argument—that a big
demographic shock can have major consequences for international factor
ﬂows—totally plausible, he expressed surprise that the impact was as
large as Williamson had suggested. Indeed, Burtless felt that simpler
explanations were at least as important.
In the case of European migration to the New World before World
War I, the simple explanation was that real wages were higher and land
prices lower in the United States than in Europe. While demographic
differences between the two regions undoubtedly contributed to the labor
ﬂows, the crucial determinant was the relative abundance of natural
resources, not the shape of the population pyramids. In Burtless’s view,
the Irish potato blight increased the wage gap between Ireland and the
United States and encouraged emigration. The same set of events would
have occurred whatever the shape of the two population pyramids.
Today, because Africans have access to more capital and better
technology in Europe than in Africa, they can also earn higher real wages
in Europe. This difference would exist regardless of the shape of the two
regions’ population pyramids, Burtless argued. While the age structure of
the population will affect the share that is willing to migrate, that
structure has only a secondary impact on the level of real wages.
By contrast, Burtless found Williamson’s story about East Asia—that
population age structure can affect a nation’s savings-investment bal-
ance—to be much more persuasive. But, Burtless argued, other develop-
ments often swamp the impact of demographics on a nation’s savings-
investment balance. As a case in point, in many OECD countries, savings
rates have recently declined as the supposedly high-saving, middle-aged
workers’ share in the population has risen, contrary to the predictions of
the demographic model. As Burtless’s work with Bosworth and Sabel-
haus suggests, factors that inﬂuence private saving within age groups can
have a larger impact on total private saving than the population’s age
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demographic model in a satisfying way, Burtless concludes from the
OECD experience that such episodes may not be the norm. In other
words, demographic shocks are important, but other inﬂuences on
savings and investment frequently overwhelm them.
Efraim Sadka also ﬁnds Williamson’s “intriguing” story, especially
the parable of African emigration, less than fully convincing. Like
Burtless, Sadka also asked if pressures to emigrate from Africa to Europe
would abate if African and European demographic proﬁles were similar.
He doubts the answer would be yes and suggests that the huge economic
advantages of living in Europe’s welfare states are unlikely to dissipate as
Africa’s demographic transition runs its course.
In this regard, Sadka also emphasizes that incentives for migration
include the education, health insurance, pension, and other beneﬁts
provided by government in addition to the economic return to labor that
Williamson discusses. Because social security systems around the world
are under ﬁnancial pressure, some have advocated increased immigra-
tion to help restore these systems to ﬁnancial balance. But, citing The New
Americans (Smith and Edmonston 1997), Sadka concludes that when all
public expenditures and taxes are taken into account, the ﬁscal beneﬁts of
immigration are highly uncertain and depend crucially on the educa-
tional attainment of the immigrants. Prime-age immigrants with less than
a high school education impose a net ﬁscal burden over their lifetimes,
while more highly educated immigrants make a net contribution.
Sadka is also not fully persuaded by Williamson’s discussion of the
impact of East Asia’s demographic transition on the region’s per capita
growth rates. After estimating the impact of growth in the working-age
population and in the total population on growth in GDP per capita, and
ﬁnding the ﬁrst to be positive and the second negative, Williamson had
concluded that demographic factors would retard East Asian growth
considerably for the next 25 years. But Sadka questions these projections,
noting the possibility of reverse causality between growth in per capita
GDP and migration. Might not high per capita GDP growth attract young
immigrants? he asks.
Sadka then suggests that Williamson’s analysis of how a country’s
demographic transition affects its savings-investment behavior may help
to explain the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, which contrasts the ﬁnancial
openness of OECD countries with the high correlation of domestic
savings and investment in the same nations. While capital market
integration presumably breaks the link between the two, the correlation
persists.
In concluding, Sadka points out that Williamson’s work should not
be interpreted as arguing that the demographic transition fully or solely
explains international factor ﬂows. Still, reading Williamson’s paper has
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shocks in this regard.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE
The conference concluded with a panel discussion on the policy
implications of projected demographic change. Joseph Chamie began by
rejoicing at his good fortune in being a demographer in the twentieth
century, an unparalleled period in demographic history. He reeled off the
century’s “gold-medal” achievements—among them, that the world
population almost quadrupled from 1.6 billion in 1900 to 6.1 billion in
2000. Within the century, the population took the shortest time ever to
double (just 39 years). It also experienced the fastest year-over-year world
population growth on record (2 percent), a rate unlikely to be reached
again. It saw unprecedented declines in fertility virtually everywhere,
signiﬁcant migration and urbanization, and revolutionary improvements
in mortality and longevity. Indeed, Chamie views the increase in longev-
ity as humanity’s greatest single accomplishment.
Looking ahead, Chamie cited the distribution of population growth
as an important aspect of the new demographic order. Currently, just six
countries—India, China, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and Indonesia—
account for half of the world’s population growth. Even more dramati-
cally, while the European Union grew by 343,000 in 2000, India grew that
much in the ﬁrst six days of the year. As this contrast suggests, Europe
and Japan are growing very little, if at all. By 2050, 39 countries are
expected to be smaller than they are today—Japan and Germany by 14
percent, Russia and Ukraine by 28 to 40 percent. By contrast, the United
States, Canada, and Australia will be 30 to 40 percent larger. And despite
the worsening AIDS crisis, the population of Africa is likely to double in
the next ﬁfty years. As a consequence, the balance of the world’s
population will shift to the Third World. While the ratio of population in
the developing world to that in the developed world is now 4:1, in 2050
that ratio will be 7:1.
Another major feature of the new demographic order will be
increased migration, with all the political and social spillovers such ﬂows
entail. To illustrate why immigration may be “a” but cannot be “the”
solution to population aging, Chamie looked at Korea. To keep Korea’s
population at its current size of 47 million until 2050 would require
immigration of 100,000 per year for the next ﬁfty years. But to keep the
ratio of the working-age to the retirement-age population constant at 12.6
would require an average of 94 million immigrants a year—an impossibly
large number.
Population aging will also be pervasive. In many countries, one of
every three people will be over the age of 65 in 2050. This aging will result
in a shift in the population’s gender mix because the ratio of females to
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about 1.2, but at 100 the ratio rises to 4. Rarely discussed are the possible
consequences of couples’ new ability to determine the sex of their fetus
and, perhaps, to create an imbalance in the gender mix of the newborn.
What are the policy implications of a larger, older, more urbanized,
and more diverse population, of which nearly 90 percent will be in the
Third World? Sure that the market will deliver the required adjustments,
many advocate a laissez-faire approach, but Chamie disagreed. He urged
acknowledging that for hundreds of millions of people in the developing
world, market forces, their governments, and the international commu-
nity are failing to deliver the food, clothing, and shelter that they need
today. In the developed world, Chamie advocated that governments look
beyond the near term and rethink their policies on hard issues like
pension reform and immigration. Facing these challenges, Chamie con-
cluded, we need vision, leadership, and resources—ﬁnancial, environ-
mental, and human. But if we are willing to play an active role in
developing an agenda based on mutual respect and internationally
recognized human rights, Chamie can foresee a better future for all the
world’s citizens.
Assaf Razin provided observations on the political economy of
demographic change and the welfare state. He noted that a ﬂow of
low-skilled immigrants to industrial countries with comprehensive wel-
fare systems tends to provoke opposition in the host countries because
low-income workers are generally the system’s net beneﬁciaries in the
short run. Pension beneﬁts are especially problematic; globally, social
security systems are facing insolvency and, in many nations, the contri-
bution rates required to balance the system are much higher than
statutory rates. Recent studies based on generational accounting methods
have underscored the high net tax burdens facing the young and
middle-aged in the industrial countries because current transfers to the
elderly are generous compared to their contributions to the pension
system. But current ﬁscal systems would last longer if net pension
liabilities were partly ﬁnanced by foreign savings. Further international
migration might also help by enlarging the tax base.
While many observers have recommended that the advanced coun-
tries might admit more immigrants to share the burden of additional
retirees, UN projections suggest that the numbers of immigrants required
to keep the elderly dependency ratio constant would be far above current
inﬂows. Indeed, many analysts view the required annual inﬂows as
politically and economically infeasible. But Razin also noted that the
actual size of the net ﬁscal burden imposed on native residents varies
signiﬁcantly with the educational attainment of the immigrants and the
number of school-age children in their households. On balance, he
suggested, the present-value ﬁscal impact of U.S. immigrants and their
descendants is positive.
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immigrants can help pay pension beneﬁts to the current elderly, it may
also seem reasonable that they may affect the current young adversely if
the immigrants are net beneﬁciaries of the welfare state. But Razin and
Sadka (1999) show that, as long as an economy is small and has good
access to world capital markets, all income groups and all age groups
living when the immigrants arrive beneﬁt from that immigration, even if
the newcomers are low-skilled and net beneﬁciaries of the pension
system. In addition, if the migration episode repeats itself or if the social
security trust accumulates a surplus that is invested to ﬁnance future
beneﬁts, all future generations are better off. Razin notes that this
intertemporal aspect of the net contribution of low-skilled immigrants is
missing in much of the literature.
By contrast, when Razin and Sadka drop the small, open economy
assumption and allow migration to affect factor prices, particularly the
wages of low-skilled workers, they show that immigration may hurt
some income groups now and in the future. Using data for 11 European
countries, Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002a) ﬁnd that while high-skilled
immigration tends to lower the labor tax burden, low-skilled immigration
tends to raise it, reducing the politically acceptable tax rate.
Finally, Razin turned to the implications of population aging for tax
rates and welfare beneﬁts in the industrial countries. Razin and Sadka
(1999) develop a model in which tax rates and the size of social transfers
between workers and retirees are determined by voting, with the
outcome reﬂecting the balance between those who gain and those who
lose from more extensive tax-and-transfer policies. While a growing
number of elderly raises the demand for beneﬁts, it also reduces the
willingness of the working-age population to agree to higher taxes and
transfers. As Razin and Sadka argue, on balance, a higher dependency
ratio is likely to lead to lower taxes and transfers. Using panel data from
1974 to 1992 for 12 European countries to explore this idea, they ﬁnd that
taxes and transfers did indeed vary inversely with these countries’ depen-
dency ratio. The dependency ratio had a signiﬁcant negative effect on both
the labor tax rate and the size of per capita transfers. These results relate to
the current debate on the privatization of social security systems in industrial
countries, since a privatized system does not redistribute income but
provides a publicly run, often mandatory vehicle for savings. Because such
systems reduce the payroll tax burden and the size of public transfers, the
Razin-Sadka model explains the growing call for privatization.
Naohiro Yashiro focused his comments on the policy implications of
demographic change in Japan. Reacting to comments made earlier in the
conference, he pointed out that while small population size does not deter
economic development (consider Switzerland and Sweden), population
decline can matter—especially if it is accompanied by population aging.
Population aging is occurring faster in Japan than in any other OECD
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seniority and ﬁxed gender roles that distort the allocation of labor.
Although Yashiro acknowledged that poorly designed social secu-
rity systems produce serious distortions, he argued that declining fertility
was a bigger problem than the conference participants had recognized—
especially in countries like Italy and Japan, where the fertility rate is well
below replacement. He felt that Gary Becker’s observation that families in
the industrial countries tend to substitute quality for quantity of children
applied to Japan between the end of World War II and the mid 1950s. But
then, after stabilizing near the replacement rate for two decades, the
fertility rate unexpectedly began a steady decline, starting in the mid
1970s and reaching 1.35 in 2000. Yashiro believes this trend is not the
result of optimal decisions but reﬂects market failure as well.
The single most important explanation for this decline in fertility is
the increased labor force participation of Japanese women, Yashiro
argued. While the Scandinavians demonstrate that high female labor
force participation need not lower fertility, Japan’s ﬁxed gender roles
make it hard for Japanese women to balance full-time work and children.
While most workers like Japan’s long-term job security and seniority-
based wages, the quid pro quo includes long hours, frequent relocation,
and a large differential between full- and part-time wages. As few
mid-career opportunities exist, women returning to work after a stint of
child care are limited to low-paid, part-time jobs. All told, the opportu-
nity costs of marriage and children are substantial for a college-educated
woman. Yashiro argues that demographers have not sufﬁciently recog-
nized that a shrinking labor force can create a vicious circle in which labor
scarcity stimulates women’s labor force participation, which leads to a
further decline in fertility, especially in countries like Japan with inﬂex-
ible gender roles. While the government is trying to raise fertility rates,
such efforts are unlikely to succeed without changes in employment
practices and increased support for two-worker families.
Turning to the issue of early retirement, Yashiro noted that a drop in
labor force participation by the elderly raises labor costs and boosts
unemployment among the young. It also narrows the tax base for social
security, increasing the tax burden on workers and ﬁrms and possibly
creating another vicious circle with further declines in labor demand and
increases in the tax burden. Usually, a person must retire from work to
receive a public pension. But if a pension is conditioned on withdrawal
from the labor market, it becomes a tax on work. Japan (partly) addresses
this problem by allowing individuals ages 60 to 64 to maintain their
incomes through a “part-employment, part-pension” system. Because
reducing pension income yen for yen with increased earnings made
semi-retirees’ wages fully taxable, in 1994 Japan cut the reduction in
pension income to one-half of any increase in earnings. But it remains
impossible for an individual working past age 60 to receive the full
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countries where the rate of taxation on the maximum social security
wealth that a worker could obtain is high, employment among the elderly
is low. Yashiro suggests that making age the only condition for a pension
might avoid discouraging the elderly from working.
Turning to immigration, Yashiro agreed with analysts who do not
believe that increased immigration can help to solve the demographic
“problem,” since migrants age and need beneﬁts too. Instead, he sug-
gested that international trade could allow a country to employ foreign
workers in their productive years without taking on responsibility for
supporting their retirement. He noted that Japan is currently following
that strategy—exporting capital to China and East Asia and then import-
ing labor-intensive goods in return. He argued that importing labor-
intensive products is more efﬁcient than importing foreign neighbors. In
addition, increased immigration would merely delay needed structural
adjustments in Japan, where labor-intensive industries are no longer
viable.
Speaking last, Richard Cooper made the case for increased immi-
gration as a partial solution to projected demographic pressures. He
began with a reminder that 95 percent of the world’s population growth
between now and 2025 will occur in the developing countries and that
birth rates have already fallen below the replacement rate in all of the rich
countries, Slavic Europe, Russia, and China. While demographic inertia
will keep the population growing in many of these countries over the
next decade or so, population growth will then turn negative; it has
already done so in Japan.
These low birth rates, combined with steady gains in longevity,
imply aging societies. Since we have had no experience in the past two
centuries with societies facing secular population decline, Cooper pointed
out that we can only speculate about the implications, which will surely
be profound. Bypassing the frequently discussed implications for pen-
sions, health care, and long-term care, he declared declines in the demand
for traditional education, for housing and related durables, and for autos
to be obvious (unless others follow the U.S. example of wanting two and
three cars per family). He also foresaw that slower labor force growth
would lead to slower productivity gains, since learning by doing is
probably most rapid for new entrants and new entrants are likely to be
the most mobile workers. Finally, he pointed to the social implications of
the decline in the extended family. Citing Nicholas Eberstadt, he noted
that if Italy’s low birth rate were to continue for two generations, 60
percent of that nation’s children would have no siblings or aunts, uncles,
or cousins. What will replace the extended family in socializing future
generations? he asked.
Cooper suggested that declines in labor force growth could be partly
offset by raising the labor force participation of women and of the elderly
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the increased leisure reaped from rising productivity could allow more
ﬂexible schedules throughout an individual’s work life rather than just
more retirement years. To enhance labor market ﬂexibility, he advocated
encouraging lifelong learning, since rapid technical change will likely
transform the workplace more than once in a single work life.
Cooper then argued that immigration deserves far more attention
than it usually gets. While immigration is rarely discussed as a policy
variable, it should be, he insisted. He proposed letting immigration to this
country increase enough to keep the dependency ratio at its 2000 level
through 2025. With no change in participation rates or tax structure, such
a proposal would keep the relationship between taxpaying and non-
taxpaying residents the same as in 2000, when the Social Security trust
fund and the federal budget were in surplus. Such a proposal would
require an extra 36 million working-age immigrants in 25 years, or almost
treble the number assumed in Census projections. Still, such a number
would be manageable—if these immigrants came from a variety of source
countries. He noted that the numbers cited were only intended to show
that maintaining the current dependency ratio through increased immi-
gration is feasible; smaller numbers of additional immigrants, possibly
seasonal or contract workers, could also prove helpful.
Finally, Cooper observed that the United States is fortunate in facing
relatively modest demographic pressures and in having a tradition of
successful immigration. In Europe and Japan, where the projected
demographic decline is larger than here, the immigrant tradition is less
strong. Still, Cooper ventured to predict that in the coming decades
immigration to all of the rich countries will be larger than now expected
and that it will be generally welcomed—even encouraged.
CONCLUSION
The conference presentations and discussions afﬁrmed very clearly
that demographic developments will transform the global economy over
the next half century. Almost everywhere, populations will age mark-
edly. The distribution of the world’s population will shift dramatically
toward the Third World as a result of stagnating or declining populations
in most of the currently industrialized countries and continued popula-
tion growth in today’s less developed nations. The ﬁnances of social
insurance systems will be strained, requiring difﬁcult decisions about
changes in beneﬁt structures and in taxes to support these programs. And
international migration will continue to change the ethnic and cultural
makeup of many countries.
Less certain is how economies will respond and adapt to the
demographic shifts. Many Third World nations are facing the huge
challenge of educating a bulging youth population and then absorbing
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ment. Their success with this task will inﬂuence how quickly population
growth rates in the less developed countries will decline and will be a
critical determinant of the growth in living standards for much of the
world’s population. Policies affecting global ﬂows of labor and capital
will also have a major impact on economic development.
In the industrial countries, the challenge will be providing for the
needs of their older residents while delaying the age at which they
become economically dependent. The rich countries will also need to
ensure that new immigrants become economically assimilated and that
all children, immigrant and native-born, have access to the same excellent
educational opportunities. In view of these challenges, the conference
participants sketched a wide range of possible scenarios. The industrial
countries could enjoy productivity booms spurred by labor shortages, or
their economies could stagnate in response to declining employment
rates, explosive growth in social insurance spending and taxes, and a
rising share of the working-age population with disadvantaged back-
grounds.
The demographic shifts we are beginning to experience are largely
the result of welcome advances in technology and public health that have
extended life expectancy, improved living standards, and reduced pop-
ulation growth. However, disparities in the level and pace of economic
development across the globe are producing pressures for massive
movements of people and capital, while population aging presents
additional challenges to established institutions. The conference presen-
tations and discussions helped to delineate the nature of the challenges
facing policymakers and to clarify some of the trade-offs that they face.
Appropriate, generally modest, policy responses now will help to maxi-
mize the chance that future generations will prosper and fully beneﬁt
from the further advances in medical care and other technologies that will
emerge in the coming decades.
SEISMIC SHIFTS: AN OVERVIEW 29